![]() In my opinion, the team must be officially given the responsibility and the authority to execute the work that needs to be done on a non-interference basis (full time assignment until completed.) This unofficial team is essentially nonexistent at this time. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order – loss of human life.Īn unofficial team (a memo defining the team and its purpose was never published) with leader was formed on 19 July 1985 and was tasked with solving the problem for both the short and long term. If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. ![]() This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing. The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. ![]() SUBJECT: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality For more info, visit Books of Note.)ĬC: B. (This memo, along with 124 other fascinating pieces of correspondence, can be found in the bestselling book, Letters of Note. In 1988 he was awarded the AAAS Award for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility for his actions. Boisjoly later revealed this memo to the presidential commission investigating the disaster and was then forced to leave Morton Thioklol after been shunned by disgruntled colleagues. 6 months prior to the launch, the following memo was sent by Roger Boisjoly - an engineer working at Morton Thiokol, the manufacturers of the solid rocket boosters - to the company’s Vice President, in which he predicted the problem and warned of a potential “catastrophe of the highest order.”īoisjoly’s warning went unheeded he then attempted to halt the launch, unsuccessfully. ![]() A subsequent investigation determined that an O-ring failure on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters, coupled with extremely cold weather around the time of launch, caused the accident. The focus of the commission's investigation shifted to the booster rocket O-rings, the efforts of McDonald and his colleagues to stop the launch and the failure of NASA officials to listen.Just 73 seconds after launch on January 28th, 1986, the Challenger space shuttle broke apart over the coast of Florida and ended the lives of all seven crew members. "I'll never forget Chairman Rogers said, 'Would you please come down here on the floor and repeat what I think I heard?' " McDonald said. And we put that in writing and sent that to NASA."įormer Secretary of State William Rogers chaired the commission and stared into the auditorium, squinting in the direction of the voice. I said I think this presidential commission should know that Morton Thiokol was so concerned, we recommended not launching below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. "I was sitting there thinking that's about as deceiving as anything I ever heard," McDonald recalled. He neglected to say that the approval came only after Thiokol executives, under intense pressure from NASA officials, overruled the engineers. The NASA official simply said that Thiokol had some concerns but approved the launch. The Two-Way Challenger Engineer Who Warned Of Shuttle Disaster Dies "And then afterwards in the aftermath, exposing the cover-up that NASA was engaged in." "One was on the night before the launch, refusing to sign off on the launch authorization and continuing to argue against it," Maier says. "There are two ways in which actions were heroic," recalls Mark Maier, who directs a leadership program at Chapman University and produced a documentary about the Challenger launch decision. Now, 35 years after the Challenger disaster, McDonald's family reports that he died Saturday in Ogden, Utah, after suffering a fall and brain damage. He also told NASA officials, "If anything happens to this launch, I wouldn't want to be the person that has to stand in front of a board of inquiry to explain why we launched." McDonald persistently cited three reasons for a delay: freezing overnight temperatures that could compromise the booster rocket joints ice forming on the launchpad and spacecraft that could damage the orbiter heat tiles at launch and a forecast of rough seas at the booster rocket recovery site. The Two-Way Your Letters Helped Challenger Shuttle Engineer Shed 30 Years Of Guilt
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